Not a First Amendment Matter: The Wileman Rationale

From the majority opinion by Justice Stevens:

First, the marketing orders imposed no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience [thus distinguishing, inter alia, Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. ___ (1996)]. Second, they do not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech [thus distinguishing, inter alia, West Virginia Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)]. Third, they do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views [thus distinguishing, inter alia, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990)]. Indeed, since all of the respondents are engaged in the business of marketing California nectarines, plums, and peaches, it is fair to presume that they agree with the central message of the speech that is generated by the generic program. Thus, none of our First Amendment jurisprudence provides any support for the suggestion that the promotional regulations should be scrutinized under a different standard than that applicable to the other anticompetitive features of the marketing orders [i.e., the rational basis standard appropriate for scrutiny of purely economic regulations].